The Atlantic Monthly published an essential read on Colonel Cross and his Gurkhas that shows that our American concept of modern, post-cold war, anti-terrorism and anti-insurgency warfare is actually “late-nineteenth-century warfare.”
To be fair, historians do call the late-nineteenth-century modern.
Mark and I befriended some of the most amazing fighting men in the foothills of Kathmandu back in 1990, “their cheerful disposition” still their most disarming advantage: Gurkhas.
Although “modern” special operations didn’t exist in America until the OSS was formed in June of 1942, “hearts and minds” combat strategy is “nineteenth-century warfare” to the Brits and the Gurkha Rifles of Nepal. Via The Atlantic
On Irregular Warfare
“Late-nineteenth-century warfare never stopped though it was masked for a time by the Cold War emphasis on atomic bombs. And in this type of warfare that you Americans must master, only two things count: the mystic dimension of service and the sanctity of an oath. It’s about the giving of one’s best when the audience is of the smallest.”
On What it Takes to Win in Anti-Terrorist and Anti-Insurgency Operations
“Though many Marine and Army grunts make a good attempt at approaching the Gurkha corporal’s standard, the fact is that we are a softer, more complaining, less fatalistic society than the one the Gurkhas represent, and morally the better for it. But that is not without its disadvantages when confronting terrorists who have a very accommodating attitude toward their own violent death.”
On How to be the Most Effective and Useful Soldier Possible
“It’s not about sugarcoated bullets and dispensing condoms in PXes,??? he said. “You can’t fight properly until you know that you are going to die anyway. That’s extreme, but that’s the gold standard. You don’t join the army to wipe your enemy’s ass. You join to kill, or for you yourself to be killed, and above all to have a good sense of humor about it.
